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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
) 
LUTHER H. THOMAS, ) 
) 
Pla int i f f -Respondent) 
) 
v s . ) CASE NO. 1 3 5 4 7 
) 
GLEN PETERSON, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
. . ) '.-
A P P E L L A N T ' S B R I E F 
S T A T E M E N T O F K I N D O F C A S E 
This is an act ion to de te rmine the r ights of the appellant 
Glen P e t e r s o n and Joes Valley, I n c . , to the possess ion of, or 
any in t e r e s t in, the p rope r ty that has fo rmer ly been assoc ia ted 
with Joes Valley, I n c . , and to quiet title to such p rope r ty . 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R C O U R T 
A judgment was en tered against the defendants, Joes 
Valley, I nc . , and Glen P e t e r s o n , which stated that the plaintiff, 
Luther H. Thomas was the owner and entitled to possess ion of 
p roper ty known as Joes Valley Marina including the specia l use 
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permi t of the United States Depar tment of Agr icu l tu re dated 
September 18, 1967, and that the defendants , Joes Valley, I nc . , 
Glen P e t e r s o n , and Omega Silver Corporat ion and al l who 
claimed ti t le under any of them to any such proper ty had no 
right, t i t le , i n t e re s t , c la im nor es ta te whatever in or upon 
such proper ty , and a l l defendants or pe rsons claiming through 
them were enjoined and deba r r ed from claiming any in te res t 
in such p roper ty . Defendan t s Motion for a New T r i a l was 
denied on January 31, 1975. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Defendant P e t e r s o n seeks an o r d e r d i smiss ing the plaintiff 's 
Complaint and quieting ti t le to proper ty r e f e r r e d to, or fo rmer ly 
a s soc ia t ed with Joes Valley Marina and the special use pe rmi t of 
the United States Depar tment of Agr icu l tu re , in defendant Joes 
Valley Mar ina , Inc. Defendant Pe t e r son further seeks an o rde r 
es tabl ishing the validi ty of h is lease to said proper ty under a 
l ease between defendant P e t e r s o n and defendant Joes Valley, 
Inc. 
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S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
The facts of the case a r e par t ia l ly in d ispute . The plaintiff 
f o rmer ly owned al l of the a s s e t s of Joes Valley Marina and the 
special use pe rmi t of the United States Depar tment of Agr icu l tu re 
a s an individual (R. 6). The plaintiff then formed a corporat ion 
known by the name of Joes Valley Mar ine , I n c . , which possessed 
the fo rmer a s s e t s of Joes Valley Marina and the spec ia l use 
pe rmi t ( R. 11-17). New stockholders were taken into Joes 
Valley Mar ina , I n c . , here inaf ter r e f e r r ed to as Mar ina , I n c . , 
and the capital izat ion of Mar ina , I n c . , was i n c r e a s e d . 
The a r t i c l e s of incorporat ion of Mar ina , Inc. , we re then 
revised which changed the name of Joes Valley Mar ina , I nc . , 
to Joes Valley, I n c . , here inaf te r Joes Valley, I n c . , will be 
r e f e r r e d to a s Valley, I n c . , (R. 18-20). 
The defendant Joes Valley, I n c . , took possess ion of the 
r e f e r r e d to p roper ty and opera ted it until the Spring of 1973 at 
which t ime Valley, I n c . , purpor ted to sel l a l l of i ts a s s e t s to 
the defendant Omega Silver Corporation (R. 20-27) . The sale 
to Omega Silver Corporat ion has since d isc la imed any in te res t 
in the a g r e e m e n t or the p rope r ty of Valley, I n c . , (R. 3). 
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On or about July 4, 1973, the defendant Valley, I nc . , made 
and executed a wr i t ten lease with the option to buy the proper ty 
fo rmer ly known a s Joes Valley Marina and which included the 
specia l use pe rmi t , in favor of the defendant Glen P e t e r s o n . 
It should be noted that defendant Glen P e t e r s o n had previously 
negotiated with Valley, Inc. , on behalf of Omega Silver Corp-
orat ion, and the lease between Valley, Inc. , and defendant Glen 
P e t e r s o n was en te red into after Omega Silver Corporat ion lost 
i n t e re s t in the proper ty acquis i t ion (R. 147). 
The dispute in the facts a r i s e s between the plaintiff and 
defendant Glen P e t e r s o n because the plaintiff contends that the 
p roper ty in Mar ina , Inc. , was t r a n s f e r r e d by a sa les ag reemen t 
(Ex. 2) dated Apr i l 19, 1972, to Valley, I n c . , (R. 10). The 
defendant contends that said proper ty was t r a n s f e r r e d from 
Marina, Inc. , to Valley, Inc. , by the r ev i sed a r t i c l e s of incorp-
orat ion and not by the sa les a g r e e m e n t (Ex .2) . 
This sa les a g r e e m e n t (Ex. 2) between the plaintiff and 
defendant Joes Valley, I n c . , was in default, and the re fo re , the 
plaintiff sought to r e c l a i m the p roper ty in accordance with said 
sa les a g r e e m e n t (Ex. 2). There fore , the plaintiff contends that the 
defendant Glen P e t e r s o n has no leasehold es ta te since Valley, I n c . , 
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does not have any p roper ty to l e a s e . The defendant Glen Pe t e r son , 
on the other hand, c la ims that the sa les ag reemen t (Ex. 2) is 
inoperat ive a s is set forth in defendant Glen P e t e r s o n ' s Argument 
on appea l . 
AR G U M E N T 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF 'S SALES CONTRACT IS VOID AND OF NO 
E F F E C T BECAUSE THE CONTRACT WAS ENTERED 
INTO WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS OF JOES VALLEY, INC. 
According the the Bus iness Corporat ion Act, § 16-10-33, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953), "The bus iness affairs of a corporat ion 
shall be managed by the board of d i r e c t o r s . , r And according to 
§ 1 6 - 1 0 - 3 8 , Utah Code Annotated (1953): 
A major i ty of the number of d i r e c t o r s fixed by the 
bylaws, .
 # . shall consti tute a quorum for the t r a n s -
action of bus iness unless a g r e a t e r number is r equ i red . 
by the a r t i c l e s of incorporat ion or the bylaws. The act 
of a major i ty of the d i r e c t o r s p resen t at a meet ing at 
which a quorum is p resen t shal l be the ac t of the board 
of d i r e c t o r s , un less the act of a g r e a t e r number is 
r equ i red by the a r t i c l e s of incorporat ion or the bylaws. 
And the defense of Ultra Vi res , § 16-10-6 (a), Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) gives the author i ty to set as ide unauthorized a c t s and s ta tes 
that: 
If the unauthorized a c t s or t r ans fe r sought to be enjoined 
a r e being, or a r e to be performed or made pursuant to 
any cont rac t to which the corporat ion is a par ty , the court 
may , if a l l of the pa r t i e s to the contract a r e pa r t i e s to the 
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proceeding and if it deems the same to be equit-
ab le , se t a s ide and enjoin the per formance of such 
cont rac t . . . 
The plaintiff s ta ted that he was in te res ted in selling the Joes 
Valley Mar ina , but that one J . R . Taylor persuaded h im to turn 
the p roper ty into a corpora t ion (R.7) . The corporat ion was called 
Joes Valley Mar ina , I n c . , here inaf te r r e f e r r e d to a s Mar ina , I n c . , 
(R.9) . It then a p p e a r s that it is the plaintiff 's contention that the 
proper ty of Mar ina , I n c . , was to be t r a n s f e r r e d to Joes Valley, 
I n c . , here inaf te r Valley, Inc . , by a sa les ag r eemen t (Ex.2) . 
The plaintiff s tated that the cont rac t was purpor tedly executed at 
a board of di rector ' s meet ing (R. 10). The sa les ag reemen t shows 
Luther H. Thomas a s se l le r and Joes Valley, Inc. , by Julian R. 
Taylor a s p u r c h a s e r , but does not indicate in what capacity 
Mr . Taylor is serving (R.13). 
The re is no quest ion that Mr . Taylor and Mr . Thomas 
signed the contract , but r a the r the question revolves around 
whether Mr . Taylor , under author i ty from the board of d i r e c t o r s , 
executed the cont rac t on behalf of Joes Valley, Inc. 
It has long been recognized in the State of Utah that an 
officer or d i r ec to r of a corpora t ion may only act with the e x p r e s s 
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or implied author i ty conveyed upon him or her by the board 
of d i r e c t o r s . Of course , day to day act iv i t ies may be ca r r i ed 
on by the officers of the corporat ion, but with the purchase or 
sale of what a p p e a r s to be the en t i re a s s e t s of Mar ina , I n c . , 
and Valley, Inc. , r e spec t ive ly , .the board of d i r e c t o r s mus t 
ac t d i r ec t ly . 
Additionally, it should be r e m e m b e r e d that while the 
plaintiff was a s tockholder , the capital ization was inc reased 
and new s tockholders has been taken into Mar ina , I n c . , at the 
t ime of the purported sa les t ransac t ion (Ex.2) . 
With r e g a r d to the alleged sa les t r ans fe r (Ex.2) from Mar ina , 
I n c . , it should be pointed out that § 16-10-74, Utah Code Annotated, 
(1953) s ta tes that: 
A s a l e . . .or other disposi t ion of al l , or substant ia l ly 
a l l , the p roper ty and a s s e t s , with or without the good 
will , of a corpora t ion , if not made in the usual and r e g -
ular course of its bus iness , may be made . . . in the 
following manne r : (a) The board of d i r e c t o r s shal l 
adopt a resolu t ion recommending such sa le , . . . and 
d i rec t ing the submiss ion thereof to a vote a t a meet ing 
of sha reho lde r s . . . " 
The r e s t of section 16-10-74 then goes on to specifywhat the 
p rocedure should be with r e g a r d to the sha reho lde r s mee t ing . Since 
it a p p e a r s that the sha reho lde r s a r e the same p e r s o n s a s the officers 
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and d i r e c t o r s , the r e a l quest ion comes down to whether or not 
a resolu t ion was passed by the d i r e c t o r s , and whether in fact 
any act ion, e i ther o ra l ly or wri t ten , or formal ly or informally 
was ever taken by such board of d i r e c t o r s . This is important 
with not only the sa les of a l l of the a s s e t s of Mar ina , Inc. , but 
a l so with r e g a r d to Valley, Inc. , who cannot be bound to any 
such contrac t un less it has been taken pursuant to the author i ty 
ves ted in the board of d i r e c t o r s . 
It was stated in Lochwitz v. Pine Tree Min. & Mill Co. , 
37 U. 349, 108 P. 1128 (1910) that: 
The board of d i r e c t o r s to whom the author i ty to bind the 
corpora t ion is commit ted is not the individual d i r e c t o r s 
s ca t t e r ed he re and the re , whose a s s e n t to a given act 
may be col lected by a dil igent c anvas se r , but it is the 
. b o a r d itting and consulting together in a body. Indiv-
idual d i r e c t o r s , or any number of them le s s than a 
quorum, have no author i ty as d i r e c t o r s to bind the 
corpora t ion . And this is equally the ru le , although 
the d i r ec to r who a s s u m e s to do so may own a m a j -
o r i ty of the s h a r e s . . . under our statute the powers 
_ of the co rpora t i n mus t be exe rc i sed by a quorum of 
the board of d i r e c t o r s when a s sembled as a body. 
The pres ident , the re fore , could not make a binding 
cont rac t . . . un less author ized to do so by such a 
quorum. 
The Court in Lochwitz goes on to point out that if such were not the 
ru le , con t rac t s could eas i ly be entered into to the ruin of the c o r p -
ora t ion and the s tockho lders . 
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It should be pointed out that our situation is not the same 
a s presented in Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Hydroswift Corp. 
U. 2d _ , 528 P . 2d 156 (1974) where the Court stated that: 
It is not to be doubted that enter ing into such a 
contrac t by a corporat ion not only usual ly i s , but 
should be done, by authorizat ion of i ts board of 
d i r e c t o r s . . . . t h i s is subject to exceptions 
according to the r equ i r emen t s of jus t ice and 
equity in individual c a s e s . There is a l so a well 
recognized rule that a corporat ion may not r e -
p resen t to another par ty that it has executed a 
valid cont rac t , induce the other to per form, 
accept the benefi ts , and then when it sui ts it s 
i n t e re s t , r e n e g e . . . 
Our si tuation cer ta in ly does not fall into this ca tegory . Valley, I n c . , 
cer ta in ly has not induced the plaintiff into any contact . The plaintiff 
was a l r eady into the bus iness of which he wished to escape and his 
attempting to contrac t with Valley, I nc . , was the means by which the 
plaintiff a t tempted to get out of such bus ines s . There fo re , the gen-
e ra l rule mus t be followed which r e q u i r e s the board of d i r e c t o r s to 
au thor ize such a sa les cont rac t . 
It is fur ther emphas ized that action must be taken by the 
board of d i r e c t o r s with r e g a r d to such a m a t t e r where the Court in 
Fos t e r v. Blake Heights Corporat ion, U. 2d , 530 P . 2d 815 
(1974) noted that nsfj o officer or agent of a corpora t ion has author i ty 
to make a cont rac t to se l l i ts r ea l es ta te withoutlaction thereon by 
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the board of d i r e c t o r s H . " Again s imi la r s t a tements a r e made 
by the Court in Jackson v. Bonneville I r r . Dist . , 66 U. 404, 243 
P . 107 (1926). 
The Dis t r ic t Judge s ta tes in his Memorandum Decision in the 
p resen t act ion that n the evidence indicates that the books and r e c o r d s 
of the corpora t ion we re so c a r e l e s s l y and imperfec t ly kept a s not to 
show the ac t s of the corpora t ion , and it has been held that in such 
event such ac t s and reso lu t ions may be proved by parol , in the 
absence of a s tatute to the con t r a ry . (See 29 Am. J u r . 2d p. 536). n 
The defendant has no d i s a g r e e m e n t with th is s ta tement and in fact 
quotes Copper King Mining Co. , v. Hanson, 52 U. 605, 176 P . 623 
(1918) where in the Court s ta tes that, "Any act of the d i r e c t o r s may 
be proven by o ra l tes t imony, when it is shownthat no r e c o r d was 
made of such act ion, or when it is shown that if such r e c o r d was 
made it has been l o s t . " 
However, it should be noted that minutes and board reso lu t ions 
were made and r e c o r d e d for other ac t ions taken by the board of 
d i r e c t o r s . Such minu tes and reso lu t ions included a reso lu t ion 
record ing the change in corpora te name and a reso lu t ion was r eco rded 
in the board meet ing record ing the defendant P e t e r s o n ' s l e a s e . In 
fact, it a p p e a r s that the only resolut ion that was not r eco rded was 
the reso lu t ion with r e g a r d to the plaintiff 's sa les cont rac t (Ex. 2). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 1 1 -
The plaintiff does not claim that any r e c o r d s were lost , 
but it cer ta in ly m u s t appear axiomat ic , that the plaintiff has 
the burden of showing that the d i r e c t o r s took such act ion or 
made any such reso lu t ion . 
There fore , let us look at the r eco rd to de t e rmine if the 
plaintiff ever made such a showing. The plaintiff s tated that he 
could not r e m e m b e r a l l the deta i l s that went on a t the meet ing at 
which the corpora te action was to have been taken with r e g a r d 
to the sa les cont rac t (R. 11), and that he read the contract while 
the meet ing was being c a r r i e d on. The plaintiff s ta ted that he knew 
of no minutes of any meet ing which would per ta in to the sa les 
cont rac t (R. 13). The plaintiff s tated that he did not know if the 
sa les contract (Ex. 2) showed any designation of any officer of 
the Valley, I n c . , (R. 13), and said contract does not infact contain 
any such notation (Ex, 2). It should a l so be noted that while § 1 6 -
1 0 - 4 , Utah Code Annotated (1953) author ized a corporat ion to have 
a sea l , that no such seal was placed on the sa les cont rac t (Ex .2) . 
Also , it does not appear that the s e c r e t a r y of the corporat ion signed 
the document (Ex. 2). 
The Court in fact sustained the defendant 's objection that the 
plaintiff had not sufficiently laid a foundation to int roduce the sa les 
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contract at that t ime (R. 14)0 A s imi l a r objection was sustained 
a s to the bylaws of the corpora t ion , Valley, Inc. , and the Court 
suggested that the s e c r e t a r y of the corporat ion, Mr. Carnaval i , 
be quest ioned to see if these documents could be introduced by 
him, (R.17) . 
When Mr . Carnaval i was quest ioned with r e g a r d to the sa les 
a g r e e m e n t (Ex. 2), he s ta ted that he had a gene ra l unders tanding 
of the sa l e s a g r e e m e n t (R.75), but that he had never seen the 
a g r e e m e n t nor did he have a copy of it (R. 97). Again, the Court 
did not let the sa les a g r e e m e n t be introduced into evidence 
(R. 77-79) . 
Finally the lower court s tated with r e fe rence to the a d m i s -
sibil i ty of the sa les contract (Ex.2) , " I think I a m going to admi t 
the a g r e e m e n t a s i l lus t ra t ive of his tes t imony only without any 
quest ion about the legal i ty of it . . . . But that does not es tab l i sh 
now the validity of the a g r e e m e n t . That r e m a i n s o p e n . n (R. 156). 
In fact, the plaintiff never at any t ime proved that the sa les a g r e e -
ment (Ex. 2) was ever passed upon by a major i ty of the board of 
d i r e c t o r s , and in fact, the t r i a l court never at any t ime admit ted 
the sa l e s cont rac t into evidence for any purpose other than to be 
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i l lus t ra t ive of the plaintiff 's tes t imony. Therefore , there 
was never shown to be any action by the board of d i r e c t o r s 
to author ize the sa les cont rac t . 
POINT II. 
THE SALES CONTRACT WAS VOIDABLE AT THE 
OPTION OF THE CORPORATION BECAUSE THE 
PLAINTIFF AS THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, 
A DIRECTOR, AND GENERAL MANAGER OF JOES 
VALLEY MARINA, INC. , AND JOES VALLEY, INC . , 
BREACHED HIS FIDUCIARY DUTY IN SUCH CON-
TRACT EXECUTION WITH THE CORPORATIONS. 
The Court s tated in Branch v. Wes te rn F a c t o r s , 28 U. 2d 361, 
502 P . 2d 570 (1972) that "A d i r ec to r occupies a f iduciary re la t ionsh ip 
to his corpora t ion , and his persona l deal ings with the corporat ion 
may be avoided unless good faith and fa i rness a r e shown. '1 In 
Sweeney v. Happy Valley, 18 U. 2d 113, 417 P . 2d 126 (1966) the 
Court said, M . . . when a fiduciary deals for his own in t e re s t with 
the benefic iary, in case any question a r i s e s , such dealings should 
be scrut in ized with c a r e , and the burden is upon him to show good 
faith in the t r a n s a c t i o n . " Similar language is used in Hansen v. 
Holding Co . , 117 U. 530, 218 P . 2d 274 (1950), whe re the Court 
s tated that fl . . . cour t s of equity will carefully sc ru t in ize the 
deal ings of the mangement and set as ide such t r ansac t ions on 
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slight g rounds . " 
Good faith and fa i rness obviously requ i re a full and com-
plete d i s c lo su re to an independent and d i s in t e re s t ed board of 
d i r e c t o r s . It follows that a full and complete d i sc losu re would 
requ i re the plaintiff to s ta te such i t ems as the cont rac t p r i ce , 
the plaintiff 's profit in the m a t t e r , possible alternatives open 
to the corpora t ion , and the value of the p roper ty . Yet in the 
.present si tuation, not only w e r e these things not done, but in 
fact, t he re was never any d i scuss ion a s to the m a t t e r and it 
a p p e a r s that the only person that has been shown to be privy 
to the negotiat ion was M r . J . R . Taylor , the apparen t pres ident 
of Mar ina , Inc., and la te r Valley, Inc. 
As is s tated in 19 A m . Jur .2d § 1281: 
P e r s o n a l deal ings with the corporat ion or t r ansac t ions 
with the corpora t ion in which the d i r ec to r has some 
pe r sona l i n t e r e s t may be avoided unless good faith 
and fa i rness a r e shown. While occupying such a fid-
uc i a ry re la t ion , the officers and d i r e c t o r s of a c o r p -
ora t ion a r e precluded from receiving any persona l 
advantage without the fullest d i s c lo su re , and a s s e n t 
of, a l l concerned . 
Again, it does not appear that the r e q u i r e m e n t s s tated in 19 Am. 
Jur .2d § 1281 have even attenapted to be complied with since not 
only was the re not full d i s c lo su re , but there was in fact, no d i s c lo su re 
wha t soeve r . 
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The Court noted in Hogan & Hall & Higgins, L i e , v. Hall, 
18 U. 2d 3, 414 P 2d 89 (1966) that it was " . . . cognizant of 
the fact that there a r e thousands of d i r e c t o r s who a r e unaware 
of the respons ib i l i t i es of their posi t ions, and do not r ea l i ze that 
their pe r sona l i n t e r e s t s a r e subordinated to that of thei r co rp-
orat ion in case of conf l ic t ." It cannot se r ious ly be contended 
that the plaintiff was concerned about the in te res t of the co rpor -
at ion. 
The plaintiff in fact stated that he wanted to get out of the 
bus iness for health r e a s o n s (R. 6), and it cer ta in ly does not 
appear that the plaintiff r ea l i zed that his i n t e re s t s were sub-
ordinated to that of his corpora t ion . 
There a r e many cases that a s s e r t what the duty of a f iduciary 
is to his corporat ion, Cox v. B e r r y , 19 U 2d 352, 431 P . 2d 575 
(1967): Rocket Min. Corp . v. Gill, 25 U. 2d 434, 483 P . 2d 897 
(1971): Ba rke r v. Glenwood, 82 U. 100, 21 P . 2d 889 (1933), but 
suffice it to say as quoted from Chapman v. Troy Laundry Co. , 
87 U. 15, 47 P . 2d 1054 (1935), if d i r e c t o r s » . . . se l l or dispose 
of corpora te p roper ty with a view to gain persona l advantage r a t h e r 
than for the purpose of enhancing the in t e re s t s of the corporat ion, 
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they a r e guilty of bad faith. M 
There fo re , s ince the plaintiff did not deal with the corpora t ion 
in good faith and f a i r n e s s , the contrac t is voidable at the option of 
the corpora t ion . And since the corpora t ion has sought to set the 
contract a s ide , the Court should allow such action on the corpor-
ation' s behalf. 
POINT I I I . 
THE PROPERTY REFERRED TO IN THE PLAINTIFF 'S 
SALES CONTRACT WAS ALREADY THE PROPERTY OF 
JOES VALLEY, INC., AND AS SUCH, THE PLAINTIFF 
HAD NOTHING TO CONVEY BY CONTRACT. 
The t r i a l court s tated in i ts Memorandum Opinion that the 
defendant P e t e r s o n can only a s s e r t his c la im of r ight by r ea son of 
the plaintiff 's sa les contrac t (Ex.2) and not o therwise , and there fore , 
if the plaintiff sa les cont rac t is invalid, the defendant P e t e r s o n will 
have no r igh ts t he reunde r . However, the defendant P e t e r s o n does 
not c la im to a s s e r t h is leasehold es ta te through the sa les cont rac t 
(Ex. 2) ,but r a the r s t a tes that the proper ty sought to be conveyed by 
the plaintiff to Valley, I n c . , was a l r eady the proper ty of Valley, Inc. 
There fo re , even if the sa les cont rac t (Ex.2) is o therwise valid, 
the plaintiff had nothing to convey to Valley, Inc. , s ince said p roper ty 
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was a l r eady in Valley, Inc. And if the sa les contract (Ex.2) 
is found to be invalid, the invalidity of said contract doesn ' t 
affect the l e a s s e e ' s r ights because the l e s see does not claim to take 
p roper ty by r eason of the sa les contract , but r a the r the l e s s e e ' s 
r igh ts a r e independent of the sa les contract since the proper ty was 
a l r eady t r a n s f e r r e d to Valley, Inc. 
It is ax iomat ic that a person cannot convey proper ty which he 
does not own or which has o therwise been put beyond his personal 
control . The t r i a l court stated in its Memorandum of Opinion that 
the plaintiff was 100% stockholder in Joes Valley Mar ina , I n c . , 
(R. 48) i . e . , Marina, Inc. , and the re does not appear to be any con-
tention by the plaintiff to the con t ra ry . However, it appea r s to be 
the plaintiff 's position that the p roper ty t r a n s f e r r e d by Marina , i n c . 
to Valley, I n c . , was by cont rac t . Thedefendent P e t e r s o n ' s posi t ion 
is that the p rope r ty was t r ans f e r r ed by a revis ion to the a r t i c l e s of 
incorpora t ion . 
§ 16-10-61 Utah Code Annotated (1953) gives a corporat ion the 
power to change its name by amending its ar t ic les of incorporat ion. 
If such prodecure is c a r r i ed out, obviously the only change in the 
s t ruc tu re would be the name or any other m a t t e r r e f e r r e d to in the 
r e s t a t ed a r t i c l e s of incorpora t ion . 
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The tax r e t u r n s for the y e a r s of 1971 and 1972 of Joes 
Valley Marina , Inc. , showed deprec ia t ion of the a s s e t s which 
had been the proper ty of Joes Valley Marina before incorporat ion, 
and as such this suppor ts the position that the a s s e t s had been 
t r ea ted by the plaintiff as though they were the proper ty of Marina, 
Inc. (R. 54), The plaintiff test if ied that a l l the proper ty under 
Marina , I n c . , was his en t i re ly (R.47) . 
The plaintiff then testified that he amended the a r t i c l e s of 
incorporat ion of Mar ina , I n c . , to i n c r e a s e the capital izat ion 
(R.49) . The plaintiff then stated that he once again amended the 
a r t i c l e s of incorpora t ion to change the name from Joes Valley 
Marina I n c . , to Joes Valley, I n c . , and that he opera ted the mar ina 
personal ly , except in the winter t ime , up and unti l 1972 (R. 49-50) . 
The re fo re , by the plaintiff 's own tes t imony, the amended a r t i c l e s 
of incorporat ion m e r e l y changed the name from Joes Valley Marina , 
I n c . , to Joes Valley, Inc. , and as such the proper ty became Joes 
Valley, Inc. , by such amendment . 
Addit ionally, the plaintiff sought to t r ans fe r his use pe rmi t a s 
a gene ra l manager to Joes Valley, I n c . , (R. 56-57) pr ior to the sa les 
cont rac t (Ex.2) (R. 142). And it a p p e a r s that one of the r e a s o n s that 
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the sa les ag r eemen t came about was because of some difficulty 
in having the Fo re s t Service t ransfer the use pe rmi t from Marina, 
I n c . , to Valley, I n c . , because of an outstanding obligation owed to 
a third par ty , Mr . Falsone (R.57) . The plaintiff a l so testified 
that he withdrew his use pe rmi t from the U . S . F o r e s t se rv ice 
and obtained a specia l use permi t for Joes Valley, I n c . , while 
acting a s a genera l manager for Joes Valley, Inc . , (R . 58). 
Finally, the plaintiff admi ts that Marina , I n c . , and Valley, 
Inc. , a r e one and the same entity other than the name (R. 64-65). 
The plaintiff, however , denies that he ever t r a n s f e r r e d any proper ty 
to Mar ina , I n c . , (R. 65), but this appea r s inconsis tent with his act ions 
with r e g a r d to income tax and the ruling by the t r i a l cour t . That i s , 
it appea r s that Marina , Inc. , t rea ted the p roper ty a s i ts own (R. 54) 
and it does not appear that the plaintiff t rea ted the p roper ty a s his 
in his individual tax r e t u r n s for 1971 and 1972# 
Therefore , since the proper ty had a l r eady vested in Valley, Inc. , 
p r io r to the sa les cont rac t (Ex.2) , the plaintiff had nothing to convey. 
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POINT IV. 
I F THE PROPERTY FORMERLY OF JOES 
VALLEY MARINA, AND FORMERLY OF 
JOES VALLEY MARINA, INC. , WAS NOT 
TRANSFERRED TO JOES VALLEY, INC. , 
SO AS TO QUALIFY JOES VALLEY, INC. , 
AS DE JURE CORPORATION, THE PLAINTIFF 
SHOULD BE ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT THE 
SAID PROPERTY WAS PROPERLY VESTED IN 
JOES VALLEY, INC. , AS A DE FACTO CORPOR-
ATION. 
18 Am, J u r . 2d i 51 , s t a tes that: 
It is o rd ina r i ly e s sen t i a l to the exis tence of a de facto 
corpora t ion that the re be (1) valid law under which a 
corpora t ion with the powers a s s u m e d might be incor -
porated; (2) a bona fide a t tempt to organize a c o r p o r -
at ion under such law; and (3) an ac tua l exe rc i s e of 
co rpora te p o w e r s . 
In consider ing these e l emen t s , it a p p e a r s that the Utah s tatutes allow 
a corpora t ion such a s Valley, I n c . , and it a l so a p p e a r s that the re 
was a bona fide a t t empt to organize Valley, Inc. , if it was in fact 
not o rgan ized . Additionally, it a l so a p p e a r s that the corporat ion 
actual ly exe rc i s ed its corpora te powers when it executed a valid 
l ease in favor of the defendant P e t e r s o n (R. 148-149) . 
De facto corpora t ions have long been recognized in the State 
of Utah. In the case of Mar sh v. Mathias , 19 U. 350, 56 P . 1074 
(1899), the Court said: 
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Wherether there a r e such defects in the o r -
ganizat ion as would render it vulnerable to 
an a t tack by the s tate itself is a question not 
n e c e s s a r y for use to decide in this case . . . 
Moreover , where , a s in the case at ba r , there 
has been such a bona fide a t tempt to c rea te a 
corpora t ion , and in like good faith such an 
assumpt ion and exe rc i s e of corpora te function, 
a s to consti tute a corporat ion de facto, the legal 
exis tence of the corpora t ion cannot, a s a gene ra l 
ru le be inquired into col la tera l ly , even though 
there be an absence of compliance with some of 
the legal fo rmal i t i e s . . . the complainants a r e 
s tockholders , and have dealt with the corpora t ion 
since its organiza t ion , and have recognized its 
powers and acquiesced in the exe rc i se thereof 
for a l a rge number of y e a r s , they a r e estopped 
from questioning in such a proceeding a s this 
the rightful exis tence of the corporat ion . . . a 
s tockholder who has par t ic ipated in its ac t s as 
a corporat ion de facto is estopped to deny its 
rightful ex i s t ence . 
The case of Vincent Drug C o . , v. Utah State Tax Comm., 17 U. 2d 
202,407 P . 2d 683 (1965) rea f f i rms this posit ion. This appea r s to 
be in line with our p resen t s i tuat ion. The plaintiff has allowed the 
corporat ion to c a r r y on i ts exis tence as though it has owned a l l the 
r e f e r r e d to p roper ty , if in fact the corporat ion did not,and as such 
should be estopped from claiming to innocent third pa r t i e s that he 
owns the p roper ty individually and that the corporat ion in fact 
owns nothing. 
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Additionally, equitable estoppel i tself should preclude 
the plaintiff f rom a s s e r t i n g that Valley, Inc . , did not have any 
proper ty to convey. The case of Wilson v. Westinghouse ElecP 
C o r p . , 85 Wash 2d 78, 530 P . 2d 298 (1975) s ta tes that equitable 
estoppel may a r i s e when a person commi t s : 
(1) an admiss ion , s ta tement , or ac t inconsis tent 
with the c la im a f te rwards a s s e r t e d ; (2) action by 
the other par ty on the faith of such admiss ion , 
s t a tement or act ; (3) injury to such other party 
resu l t ing from permit t ing the f i r s t par ty to con t ra -
dict or repudia te such admiss ion , s ta tement or ac t . 
This a p p e a r s to be the position taken by the Utah Court in Migliaccio 
v. Davis 120 U. 1, 232 P . 2d 195 (1951) where in the Court s ta ted: 
Equitable es toppel . . . is the principle by which a par ty 
who knows or should know the t ru th is absolutely p r e -
cluded, both a t law and in equity, f rom denying or a s s e r t -
ing the con t r a ry of, any m a t e r i a l fact, which, by his 
words or conduct, aff i rmative or negative, intention- . 
al ly or thourgh culpable negl igence, he has induced 
another , who was excusably ignorant of the t rue facts 
and who had a r ight to re ly upon such words and con-
duct, to bel ieve and ac t upon them thereby, as a 
consequence reasonably to be ant ic ipated, changing 
his position in such a way that he would suffer injury 
if such denial or con t ra ry a s s e r t i o n were al lowed. 
There fo re , the theory of equitable estoppel should be applied aga ins t 
the plaintiff because : F i r s t , the plaintiff had m a t e r i a l l y mi s l ead the 
defendant P e t e r s o n into believing that the Valley, Inc. , was the owner 
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of the p roper ty fo rmer ly r e f e r r ed to as Joes Valley Marina , 
or Joes Valley Mar ina , Inc. The ma te r i a l l y mis leading act 
took place because the defendant P e t e r s o n had previous ly ne -
gotiated with the plaintiff on behalf of Omega Si lver , and that 
while the plaintiff may have indicated that Valley, I n c . , owed 
him money, the plaintiff did not indicate to the defendant Pe t e r son 
that Valley, Inc. , was not the t rue owner of the above r e f e r r ed 
to p rope r ty (R. 20-27) . It should be pointed out that the plaintiff 
c la imed to have shown defendant pe te r son a sa les ag reemen t with 
Valley, I n c . , (R. 22), but the plaintiff never proved his al legat ion 
and the defendant P e t e r s o n c la ims to the con t ra ry (R. 124);. 
Second, the defendant Pe t e r son entered into a lease with Valley, 
I n c . , because of the m a t e r i a l m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n r e f e r r e d to, 
and obviously because the defendant Ffeterson believed that Valley, 
Inc. , was the owner of said p roper ty (R. 147); Third, the defendant 
P e t e r s o n will be adve r se ly affected and m a t e r i a l l y injured if the 
plaintiff is allowed to contradict his previous posit ion that Valley, 
I n c . , was the owner of said proper ty , and now state that Valley, 
I n c . , is not the owner and addit ionally, it would be ex t r eme ly in-
equitable to allow the plaintiff to a s s e r t such an inconsis tent 
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position to the de t r imen t of the defendant P e t e r s o n . 
Also , it should be noted that the plaintiff was the one who 
allowed himsel f to be convinced by Mr . Taylor of the p ropr ie ty 
of the or ig ina l incorporat ion (R.7) , and it has been noted on 
s e v e r a l occass ions by the Court that where one of two innocent • 
pa r t i e s mus t suffer, the loss should fall on the one who c rea ted 
the c i r c u m s t a n c e s which made it possible for the wrong to be 
pe rpe t r a t ed . Al l red v. Hinkley, 8 U. 2d 73, 328 P . 2d 726 (1958); 
Valley Bank & T r u s t Co. v. Ge rbe r , U. 2d , 526 P . 2d 
1121 (1974). 
There fo re , the plaintiff should be estopped from a s s e r t i n g that 
Valley, Inc. , did not have the power to convey proper ty to the 
defendant P e t e r s o n and this is by r ea son that if Valley, I n c . , did 
not in fact have the ac tua l power to so convey the p roper ty , the 
plaintiff s t i l l may not so a s s e r t under the theo r i e s of equitable estoppe 
and de facto corpora t ion . 
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POINT V 
ANY INTEREST CONVEYED BY THE PLAINTIFF 'S 
SALES CONTRACT IS A SECURITY INTEREST AND 
SINCE THE PLAINTIFF NEVER P E R F E C T E D HIS 
SECURITY INTEREST, THE PLAINTIFF MAY NOT 
. NOW ASSERT SUCH SECURITY INTEREST. 
§ 70A-9-102, Utah Code Annotated (1953) s t a t e s : 
(1) . . . this chapter appl ies so far as concerns any 
persona l p roper ty and fixtures within the j u r i s -
••' diction of this state (a) to any t ransac t ion ( r ega rd -
l e s s of i ts form) which is intended to c rea te a 
secur i ty in t e res t in persona l proper ty or f ixtures 
including goods, documents , i n s t rumen t s , gene ra l 
intangibles , chattle paper , accounts or contract 
r i gh t s ; . . . (2) This chapter appl ies to secur i ty 
i n t e r e s t c rea ted by contract including pledge, 
a s s ignment , chattel mor tgage . . . or ti t le r e -
tention contract and lease or consignment 
intended a s s ecu r i t y . 
The p roper ty r e f e r r e d to in the sa les contract (Ex.2) is a use pe r -
mit to the p rope r ty of the L'nited States Department of Agr icu l tu re , 
and f ixtures a t tached to said p roper ty . Additionally, the sa les 
contract (Ex.2) is a title re ta ining cont rac t . There fo re , the t r a n s -
action comes under the Uniform Commerc ia l Code, Secured T r a n s -
act ion Ti t le . 
£ 70A-9-203, Utah Code Annotated (1953) s t a tes that: 
. . . a secur i ty in t e re s t is not enforceable aga ins t 
the debtor or third pa r t i e s unless . . . (b) the debtor 
has signed a secur i ty ag reement which contains a 
descr ip t ion of the col la teral . . . 
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The plaintiff admit ted in his memorandum in support of 
s u m m a r y judgment that the plaintiff has not filed a financing 
s ta tement with the S e c r e t a r y of State of Utah. A tit le re taining 
ag reemen t mus t be filed in the S e c r e t a r y of Sta te ' s office in 
o rde r to be perfected, § 70A-9-401 (1) (b), and it can be seen, 
the re fo re , that the plaintiff 's secur i ty i n t e re s t is not perfected. 
Addit ionally, § 70A-9-301 (1), Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
s ta tes that: 
Except a s o therwise provided in subsect ion (2), an 
unperfected secur i ty i n t e re s t is subordinate to the 
r igh ts of . . . (c) in the case of good, i n s t rumen t s , 
documents , and chat tel paper , a person who is not 
a secured par ty and who is a t r a n s f e r r e e in bulk or 
o ther buyer not in o rd ina ry course of bus iness to 
the extent that he gives value and r ece ive s de l ivery 
of the co l l a t e ra l without knowledge of the secur i ty 
i n t e r e s t and before it is perfected. 
In the plaintiff 's motion for s u m m a r y judgment, he contends that the 
defendant P e t e r s o n did not (1) rece ive physical possess ion of the 
co l la te ra l , (2) the defendant P e t e r s o n did not r ece ive de l ivery of 
the co l l a t e ra l without knowledge of the plaintiff 's secur i ty in te res t , 
and (3) the defendant P e t e r s o n did not give va lue . The t r i a l cour t 
in its m e m o r a n d u m opinion (p. 2-3) s tated that the defendant 
P e t e r s o n had knowledge of the plaintiff 's i n t e re s t in said proper ty , 
that the defendant never had possess ion of the proper ty , that the 
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defendant failed to obtain the wri t ten approval o f the U . S . De-
par tment of Agr icu l tu re , as requi red by the defendant 's l ease , 
nor did the defendant per form other t e r m s of the l e a s e . 
It should be pointed out that the plaintiff was precluded from 
taking physical possess ion of the proper ty . The defendant failed 
to obtain wr i t ten approval of the U .S . Department of Agr icu l tu re 
and failed to pe r fo rm any other t e r m s of the lease by reason 
of the action of the plaintiff, third pa r t i e s , or Valley, I n c . , and 
there fore , such conditions may not preclude the plaintiff from 
enforcing his l e a s e . It should be pointed out that with re fe rence 
to these that no evidence was put into the r e c o r d about such m a t t e r s 
and the plaintiff never proved such to be the case . 
Therefore , a considerat ion of § 70A-9-301 (1) (c) appears, 
to be in o r d e r . F i r s t of a l l , while the defendant admi ts that he 
knew that Valley, Inc. , may have owed the plaintiff some money, 
the defendant Pe t e r son did not know that the plaintiff had a secur i ty 
in t e res t in the p roper ty of Valley, Inc . , (R. 124). Knowledge, a s 
r e f e r r e d to in this sect ion, means actual knowledge. Secondly, the 
defendant was precluded by ac t s of the plaintiff from performing 
the conditions of the l e a s e . Additionally, § 70A-1-201 (44), Utah 
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Code Annotated (1953) defines value when it s ta tes that: 
. . . a person gives "value11 for r ights if he acqu i r e s 
them. . . (d) genera l ly , in r e tu rn for any considerat ion 
sufficient to support a s imple con t rac t . 
Finally, a s indicated the defendant did not rece ive physical pos-
sess ion of the ac tua l p roper ty by ac t s of the plaintiff. This point 
a s ide , § 70-A-9-301 (1) (c) r e f e r s to the del ivery of co l la tera l of 
chattel paper . § 70A-9-105, Utah Code Annotated (1953) s t a t es : 
(b) "Chat te l paper" means a writ ing or wr i t ings which 
evidence both a mone ta ry obligation and a secur i ty 
i n t e re s t in or a lease of specific goods. When a t r a n s -
act ion is evidenced both by such a secur i ty ag reemen t 
or l ease and by an i n s t r u m e n t or s e r i e s of ins t ruments 
the group of wr i t ings taken together const i tutes chattel 
pa pe r . 
The defendant Peterson !s wr i t ing , i . e . , l ea se , evidences both a mone ta ry 
obligation and a l ease of specific goods, i . e . , use permi t and lease of 
f ixtures a t tached t h e r e t o . 
There fo re , the re does not appear to be any r eason why the 
plaintiff should be allowed to a s s e r t his secur i ty in te res t agains t the 
defendant P e t e r s o n . 
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POINT V I . 
THE SALES CONTRACT WAS IMPROPERLY 
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE BY THE TRIAL 
COURT AND WAS, THEREFORE, REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
The plaintiff instituted a law suit to r e p o s s e s s cer ta in 
pe rsona l p roper ty and a use permi t purportedly sold on a con-
ditional sa les ag reemen t at tached to pla int i f fs complaint . 
Because of the alleged default of defendant Joes Valley it was 
vital to the plaintiff rs case to have said contract introduced 
into evidence^ that it was a valid contract and that the commerc ia l 
code pertaining to the filing of a secur i ty in te res t had been a c -
complished. The plaintiff made seve ra l a t tempts to introduce 
the contrac t over objection of the appellant . When it became 
obvious that the plaintiff could not introduce the contract as a 
contract , the Court admit ted the contract as i l lus t ra t ive of 
plaintiff 's tes t imony without any quest ions concerning its legali ty 
and that it did not es tab l i sh the validity of the ag reemen t (R. 156). 
The t r i a l judge in his findings then used the contract as 
a bas i s of then finding that there was a conditional sa les ag reemen t 
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and that the plaintiff was entit led to r e c o v e r . The contract 
was not admiss ib l e under any c i r cums tances and was not 
i l lus t ra t ive of plaintiff 's tes t imony and should have not been 
admit ted for any purpose . 
Without a contrac t being proper ly admit ted into evidence 
as a cont rac t , the plaintiff has completely failed to es tab l i sh 
his case and the Court should have as a m a t t e r of law d i smis sed 
plaintiff 's complaint on file. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
In conclusion, a thorough reading of the t r a n s c r i p t shows 
that the purported sa les a g r e e m e n t which is the subject ma t t e r 
of this lawsuit is not a valid contract because it was not approved 
by the board of d i r e c t o r s . That the plaintiff did not have anything 
to sel l because the corpora t ion a l r eady owned the i tems l isted 
on the purported cont rac t and that the contract which is the bas i s 
of this act ion to begin with was never proper ly admit ted into 
evidence as a cont rac t and that the Court should have d i smis sed 
plaintiff 's complaint and found as a m a t t e r of law no cause of 
ac t ion. 
Respectfully submit ted, 
Eve re t t E. Dahl 
760 Eas t Center S t ree t 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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